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I. INTRODUCTION 
The sores of civil war and the ethnic cleansing between various tribal groups 
have long plagued the continent of Africa.1 The country of Chad has been no 
exception to this sad reality.2 In 1979, a civil war within the borders of this 
particular region ended;3 however, it did not take long for the bloodshed to 
resume.4 Only two short years later, then Defense Minister Hissene Habré 
overthrew the national unity government and began a campaign of widespread 
repression.5 This repression was largely characterized by nothing short of the 
ethnic cleansing of all groups, with the exception of the Goranes and their allies.6 
After the people of Chad endured eight long years of torture and killings, Habré 
was eventually overthrown from his position of power by one of his former 
generals, Idriss Deby, who ousted Habré from his reign of terror with the aid of 
Libyan forces.7 It was Idriss Deby who established the Commission of Inquiry 
into the Crimes and Misappropriations, Committed by Ex-President Habré, His 
Accomplices and/or Accessories (“the Commission of Inquiry”) to investigate 
the nature and full extent of Habré’s dealings.8 
The investigative findings of the Commission of Inquiry are overwhelming; 
according to the investigation, from the period of 1982 to 1990, “[t]he 
Commission of Inquiry counted no less than 3,780 dead.”9 This statistic does not 
include the death of twenty-six foreigners.10 These numbers should give us all 
great pause; unfortunately, the statistics only get worse. The Commission of 
Inquiry further found that 54,000 political prisoners were detained during the 
same period.11 Even still, the Commission of Inquiry was careful to note that 
these figures constitute only a modest indicator as to the scope of the calamity, 
while in reality “[t]he Commission [of Inquiry] estimates in fact that the work it 
has done covers no more than 10 percent of everything that has happened.”12 As 
 
1. See generally Anup Shah, Conflicts in Africa–Introduction, GLOBAL ISSUES, http://www. 
globalissues.org/article/84/conflicts-in-africa-introduction (last updated May 12, 2010).  
2. See generally Chad Profile, BRITISH BROADCASTING CHANNEL NEWS, (July 3, 2013, 6:40 AM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13164690. 
3. See generally Chad: Report of the Commission of Inquiry Into the Crimes and Misappropriations, 
Committed by Ex-President Habré, His Accomplices and/or Accessories, in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW 
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES,LAWS, RULINGS, AND REPORTS 51, 52 (Neil J. 
Kritz ed., 1995) [hereinafter Chad].  
4. Id.  
5. See id. at 58-61.  
6. Id. at 92.  
7. Id. at 53, 92.  
8. Id. at 53. 
9. See generally id. at 80. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 81.  
12. Id. at 80.  
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one might assume, these findings have spurred a series of litigation against 
Hissene Habré.13 
Despite all the evidence of Hissene Habré’s crimes against humanity, an 
underlying procedural issue has presented itself.14 The issue is whether Habré 
may be prosecuted for his actions despite the fact that no such crimes for those 
same actions were codified under national law at the time they were committed.15 
This procedural issue is best resolved by considering both international law16 as 
well as some of the underlying principles of natural law theory.17 It is the position 
of this Comment that relevant international law, set against the background of 
natural law theory, holds that independent sovereign nations should be able to 
prosecute the most egregious of human rights offenses despite a procedural ex 
post facto issue. 
While the ex post facto “issue” in the particular case of Hissene Habré has 
garnished a lot of attention as of late,18 it is perhaps important to note that the 
application of the ex post facto doctrine is far from an infrequent incident in the 
context of international law.19 Quite to the contrary, the application of the ex post 
facto doctrine has served to be a serious problem for the international community 
for quite some time.20 Most notably, the problem became quite serious in as early 
as 1945 when members of the Nazi regime were prosecuted for various war 
crimes in Nuremburg, Germany.21 On this world stage, the international 
community was forced to grapple with how to hold some of the most sinister 
officials in the modern era accountable for crimes that did not exist.22 Surely 
enough, the prosecution of Hissene Habré is a true test for how the international 
community will address the pervasive ex post facto problem. 
Section II of this Comment begins by discussing the ex post facto issue as 
discussed by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) and the Economic 
Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”) Court of Justice in the suits 
 
13. See Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 2, 2003), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/ 2003/08/01/belgium-universal-jurisdiction-law-repealed. 
14. See generally Jan Arno Hessbruegge, ECOWAS Court Judgment in Habré v. Senegal Complicates 
Prosecution in the Name of Africa, 15 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 1 (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.asil.org/insights/ 
volume/15/issue/4/ecowas-court-judgment-habr%C3%A9-v-senegal-complicates-prosecution-name-africa. 
15. Id. at 2-3. 
16. See infra Part III. 
17. See infra Parts V.A, VI.B. 
18. See Miša Zgonec-Rožej, African Union Tribunal Opens to Try Chad’s Habre, CHATHAM HOUSE 
(Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/189331. 
19. See generally Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 
554 (1995). 
20. See generally id. 
21. See generally Charles Wyzanski, Nuremberg: A Fair Trial, A Dangerous Precedent, THE ATLANTIC, 
(Apr. 1, 1946, 12:00 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1946/04/nuremberg-a-fair-trial-a-
dangerous-precedent/306492/?single_page=true. 
22. See generally id. 
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brought against Habré.23 This section will further detail the specific underlying 
issue of this Comment, which examines the context in which Hissene Habré 
should be prosecuted for his actions.24 Section III will discuss the role that 
international law plays in the issue.25 Section IV will sample a few international 
cases related to the focus of this Comment.26 Section V will consider two 
competing legal theories, natural law theory and legal positivism, and how each 
theory either legitimizes or competes with the thesis of this Comment.27 In turn, 
Section VI of this Comment will argue that principles of international law and 
natural law theory support the conclusion that the option to prosecute Habré 
within the Senegalese court system should have been preserved, and the creation 
of the ad hoc tribunal is necessary.28 Finally, Section VII of this Comment will 
conclude with a word on why the ex post facto issue is important for the 
international community, and what implications this particular case will have for 
similar inquiries in the context of international criminal law.29 
II. THE EX POST FACTO PROBLEM VS. HUMAN RIGHTS 
A. Litigation in the International Court of Justice 
In 2005, many victims of Habré’s alleged crimes against humanity brought 
suit in Belgium under its laws that provide for universal jurisdiction30 over 
international crimes committed abroad.31 In that same year, and in consideration 
of the allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity, a Belgian judge 
issued an arrest warrant for Habré.32 Soon after, Belgium directly filed a case 
with the ICJ in which it demanded either the extradition or prosecution of Habré 
in accordance with Belgium’s own obligation under the Convention Against 
Torture (“CAT”).33 In July of 2012, the ICJ found that by failing to submit the 
case of Habré to its competent authorities, Senegal had breached its obligation 
under article 7, paragraph 1 of CAT.34 The Court further held that, “the Republic 
 
23. See infra Parts II.A-C. 
24. See infra Part II.C. 
25. See infra Parts III.A-D. 
26. See infra Parts IV.A-B. 
27. See infra Parts V.A-B. 
28. See infra Parts VI.A-B. 
29. See infra Part VII. 
30. See Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed, supra note 13 (Belgium’s 1993 universal 
jurisdiction law permitted victims to file complaints in Belgium for atrocities committed abroad. Although the 
law was repealed in 2003, some cases that were already being investigated by Belgian courts, including 
Habré’s, were allowed to continue). 
31. Hessbruegge, supra note 14. 
32. Id. 
33. Id.  
34. Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Press Release ¶5 
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of Senegal, must, without further delay, submit the case of Mr. Hissène Habré to 
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution if it does not extradite 
him.”35 It was this ruling that led to the next chapter of litigation for Hissene 
Habré, which would take place at the ECOWAS Court of Justice.36 
B. Litigation in the ECOWAS Court of Justice 
In October of 2008, Habré filed a case with the ECOWAS Court of Justice in 
order to seek relief from a prosecution by the Senegalese government in 
accordance with a mandate issued by the African Union.37 While litigating his 
case with the ECOWAS Court of Justice, Habré argued that at the time the 
alleged international crimes were committed, Senegal did not have the necessary 
laws to assert jurisdiction over him.38 Habré’s argument was based on a provision 
of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).39 Article 
15 of the covenant provides, “[n]o one shall be held guilty of any criminal 
offense on account of any act or omission, which did not constitute a criminal 
offense, under national or international law, at the time it was committed.”40 
Upon consideration of the argument presented by Habré, the ECOWAS 
Court concluded that international custom requires international tribunals to try 
international crimes, while national courts only have jurisdiction over crimes that 
have already been codified under national law.41 The court reasoned that, “if the 
factual basis of the intention to try the applicant did not constitute criminal acts 
under national law of Senegal . . .they are under the international law obligation 
as such.”42 The ECOWAS Court made clear that the mandate issued by the 
African Union must be implemented in accordance with international custom and 
any other endeavor by Senegal outside this framework would violate the 
principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law.43 Moreover, any such action would 
additionally desecrate the stand against impunity.44 
 
(July 20, 2012), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/17084.pdf.  
35. Id. at ¶ 6. 
36. Hessbruegge, supra note 14. 
37. Id.  
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 15, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]. 
41. See Hissène Habré v. Senegal, ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/10, ¶ 58 (Ct. of Justice of the Economic 
Community of States of West Africa 2010), available at http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/2012041 
9T034816-Habre%20Ecowa%202010.pdf. 
42. Id. 
43. Id.  
44. Id. 
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C. Recent Moves by Senegal in Compliance with the ECOWAS Decision 
After the 2010 judgment issued by the ECOWAS Court, Senegal and the 
African Union have faced the challenge of establishing an ad hoc special 
tribunal.45 The initial effort has been met with much success; a joint effort by 
international donors has resulted in total contributions of nearly $12 million.46 
While the funding of the special tribunal has been successful, continued efforts 
between Senegal and the African Union will be necessary to finalize the 
tribunal’s structure.47 Tentatively, the tribunal’s structure is designed to include 
four chambers: accusation, instruction, session, and appeals.48 
Despite the initial success of setting up the ad hoc tribunal, there has been 
mounting pressure by the African Union to complete the process as quickly as 
possible.49 It has been over twenty years since Habré’s destructive reign over the 
people of Chad, and the survivors are anxious for their day in court.50 Assuming 
the establishment of the tribunal continues with little resistance, the people of 
Chad should take solace in the fact that Habré’s prosecution will stay in Africa 
through the promulgation of the ad hoc tribunal in Senegal, rather than being 
moved to a foreign location that has little to no link to Habré’s victims.51 
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITIES 
A. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 
In this case, one of the relevant primary sources of international law is 
CAT.52 This law is most applicable to Habré’s case because it speaks directly to 
the offense of torture and other related transgressions.53 Senegal became a 
signatory to CAT on February 4, 1985, and it was ratified in Senegal on August 
 
45. Christopher Tansey, Bringing Hissène Habré to Justice: Senegal to Create a Special Tribunal in 







50. See generally Senegal Tribunal to Try Hissene Habre, SUDAN VISION DAILY (Sept. 2, 2013), 
http://news.sudanvisiondaily.com/details.html?rsnpid=219239 (emphasizing the long wait of victims hoping for 
litigation to continue). 
51. Tansey, supra note 45. 
52. See Hessbruegge, supra note 14. 
53. Mary Penrose, It’s Good to be the King!: Prosecuting Heads of State and Former Heads of State 
Under International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 193, 207 (2000). 
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21, 1986.54 The law has several provisions that have particular force in the instant 
case. Part one, article four of the law provides: 
1.  Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences 
under its criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit 
torture and to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or 
participation in torture. 2. Each State Party shall make these offences 
punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their 
grave nature.55 
This provision essentially requires that each signatory to CAT take proactive 
measures to codify acts of torture under its criminal law.56 However, article seven 
of part one is even more pertinent to Habre’s case, paragraph one stipulates: 
The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged 
to have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found shall in 
the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit 
the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.57 
As noted above, this particular provision under CAT is what concerned the 
ICJ.58 Under the Convention, a signatory country must either extradite or 
prosecute.59 This is precisely what the ICJ held,60 and it is within this legal 
framework that the ECOWAS Court held that Habré must be charged.61 
B. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
An additional source of international law to be discussed is the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”).62 The UDHR was proclaimed by the 
United Nations General Assembly63 in Paris on December 10, 1948.64 The UDHR 
 
54. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment pmbl., 
June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 24841 [hereinafter CAT].  
55. Id. at art. 4(1). 
56. See id. 
57. Id. at art. 7(1). 
58. See supra Part II. 
59. See CAT, supra note 55, at arts. 5, 7. 
60. Hessbruegge, supra note 14. 
61. See generally Hissène Habré, supra note 41.  
62. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UDHR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), 
available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ [hereinafter UDHR].  
63. The General Assembly is the main deliberative, policymaking, and representative organ of the United 
Nations. Comprising all 193 Members of the United Nations, it provides a unique forum for multilateral 
discussion of the full spectrum of international issues covered by the Charter of the United Nations. About the 
General Assembly, GEN. ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS,  
http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 9, 2013). 
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is truly a milestone document in the history of human rights as it sets out, for the 
first time, several fundamental human rights to be universally recognized and 
protected.65 In particular, Article 11, subsection 2 provides, 
No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or 
international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier 
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal 
offence was committed.66 
It is this same language the ECOWAS Court found problematic when 
holding Senegal itself could not prosecute Habré under its domestic law.67 
C. International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
Another source of international law that must be addressed is the ICCPR.68 
Article 15, subsection 1 states, “[n]o one shall be held guilty of any criminal 
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal 
offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was 
committed.”69 This provision looks substantially similar to Article 11, subsection 
2, of the UDHR.70 In fact, it seems the only real difference is that the ICCPR 
replaces the term “penal offence” with “criminal offence.”71 That being said, 
there is a critical difference within the text of Article 15, subsection 2. This 
provision states, “[n]othing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment 
of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, 
was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the 
community of nations.”72 The second paragraph specifically provides that the first 
paragraph does not prevent an act to be tried that was criminal under the general 
principles recognized by the community of nations.73 The distinction in the text 
 
64. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, History of the Document, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml (last visited Mar. 27, 2014). 
65. See generally UDHR, supra note 62. 
66. Id. at art. 11(2). 
67. William Schabas, Bizarre Ruling on Non-Retroactivity From the ECOWAS Court, PHD STUDIES IN 
HUMAN RIGHTS (Dec. 4, 2010, 11:26 AM), http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2010/12/bizarre-ruling-
on-non-retroactivity.html. 
68. ICCPR, supra note 40, art. 15(1). 
69. Id. 
70. Cf. UDHR, supra note 62, at art. 11(2). 
71. ICCPR, supra note 40, at art. 15(1). 
72. Id. at art. 15(2).  
73. Id. 
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between the UDHR and the ICCPR is important and will be discussed in greater 
detail in upcoming sections.74 
D. The Rome Statute 
A final source of international law relevant to the case of Hissene Habré is 
what is known as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome 
Statute”).75 In July of 1998, a conference was held among some 160 States to 
establish the first treaty-based permanent International Criminal Court (“ICC”).76 
The treaty adopted at this conference is what serves as the basis of the Rome 
Statute.77 Within the Rome Statute, crimes falling within the ICC’s jurisdiction 
are listed along with rules of procedure that allow states to cooperate with the 
ICC.78 Several of the relevant crimes listed in Rome Statute include: genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.79 The 
codification of these crimes in the Rome Statute was negotiated on the basis of a 
draft for the statute submitted by the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court.80 The International Law 
Commission originally prepared this same draft.81 One of the essential ideals 
promulgated by the International Law Commission is that responsibility for 
international crimes must be recognized.82 It was this central ideal that ultimately 
led to the establishment of the ICC.83 Although the Rome Statute did not become 
effective until July of 2002,84 and Hissene Habré’s reign of terror lasted from 
roughly 1981 through 1989,85 the general principles recognized by the 
International Law Commission and the ICC are worth acknowledging. Wide-
ranging communities of states have recognized that crimes such as genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes need to be enforced.86 This important 
 
74. See infra Part VI.A. 
75. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter 
Rome Statute]. 
76. What is the Rome Statute?, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_  
menus/icc/about%20the%20court/frequently%20asked%20questions/Pages/3.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 2013). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 75. 
80. Laura Barnett, The International Criminal Court: History and Role, PARLIAMENT OF CANADA, (Nov. 
4, 2008), http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0211-e.htm.  
81. Id. 
82. See Introduction: Origin and Background of the Development and Codification of International Law, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, http://legal.un.org/ilc/ilcintro.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
83. Id.  
84. Rome Statute, supra note 75.  
85. Chad, supra note 3, at 90; Hessbruegge, supra note 14. 
86. Rome Statute, supra note 75, at pmbl. 
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international recognition must be considered as the international community 
processes Habré’s responsibility. 
IV. CASES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. The Nuremberg Trials 
The Nuremburg trials held at the Palace of Justice in Germany circa 1944, 
may be considered one of the earliest instances in which war criminals were 
prosecuted in the face of the principal of non-retroactivity.87 At this proceeding, 
“[t]wenty-four major political and military leaders of Nazi Germany” were 
indicted for various offenses including crimes against humanity, aggressive war, 
and war crimes.88 Also, over a hundred additional defendants were tried before 
the United States Nuremburg Military tribunals.89 These individuals, from many 
walks of German society, were represented in a series of twelve separate trials 
known as the “Subsequent Nuremburg Proceedings.”90 
A hallmark of the Nuremburg proceedings is that trial judges based many of 
the charges not on any rule of domestic law, since none existed, but instead on 
the basis of international rule.91 Valentina Spiga explains, “[i]n so doing, the 
Nuremburg International Military Tribunal adopted the doctrine of substantive 
justice as opposed to that of strict legality: that is, even in the absence of a clear 
rule banning conduct as criminal, acts that seriously harm society should not go 
unpunished.”92 The connection between this assertion promulgated by the 
Nuremburg Court and Article 15(2) of the ICCPR is no coincidence.93 As Spiga 
continues to explain, “[t]herefore, the occasio legis94 of these exceptions was 
most probably the intention to support, ex post, what had already been asserted in 
Nuremburg.”95 The history of the proceedings held in Nuremburg,96 when read in 
conjunction with Article 15(2) of the ICCPR,97 provides support for the 
proposition that there are some crimes recognized by the international 
 
87. Valentina Spiga, Non-Retroactivity of Criminal Law, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 5, 11 (Mar. 2011). 




91. Spiga, supra note 87, at 11.  
92. Id.  
93. Id. at 7; ICCPR, supra note 40, at art. 15(2). 
94. ERNEST BRUNCKEN, SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD 59 (Fred B. Rothman et al. eds., 1st ed. 1969) 
(Occasio legis: Latin; external circumstances causing the making of the rule). 
95. Spiga, supra note 87, at 12. 
96. Id.  
97. UDHR, supra note 62, at art. 15(2). 
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community that should not go unpunished because of the presence of an ex post 
facto issue.98 
B. The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
Having looked at the issue of non-retroactivity of criminal law from a 
historical perspective, it is also helpful to consider a more recent case. As 
discussed above, the ECOWAS Court made clear that Habré could only be 
punished for violations against international law through the proceedings of an 
ad hoc international tribunal to be established in Senegal.99 This decision serves 
as a contrast to the recent prosecution against former Liberian President Charles 
Taylor.100 Taylor was convicted in April of 2012 of eleven charges,101 including 
acts of terror, rape, and the conscription of child soldiers during the course of the 
1991-2002 civil war within Liberia.102 Additionally, Taylor was convicted for 
aiding and abetting rebels who committed war crimes and crimes against 
humanity in nearby Sierra Leone.103 
The prosecution of Taylor serves as a unique chapter in international law in 
one important way; Taylor was the first African head of state to be convicted by 
an international court.104 The proceedings brought against Taylor were done 
through The Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) in The Hague.105 The 
SCSL was established jointly by the government of Sierra Leone and the United 
Nations.106 The SCSL mandate is specifically to try individuals like Taylor, who 
are alleged to have committed violations of international humanitarian and Sierra 
Leonean law.107 
While one might initially recognize the similarities between the SCSL and 
the ad hoc international tribunal mandated by the ECOWAS Court of Justice, 
there are also important differences between the two courts. Most importantly, 
the tribunal set up to prosecute Habré has been established within Africa on 
Senegalese soil.108 This is an important distinction because the SCSL lost much of 
its legitimacy by prosecuting Taylor in The Hague, as opposed to its normal 
 
98. Spiga, supra note 87, at 10. 
99. Hissène Habré, supra note 41, at 61. 
100. Tansey, supra note 45.  
101. Ex-Liberia Leader Charles Taylor’s 50-year Sentence for War Crimes Sticks as He Loses Appeal, 
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location in Freetown.109 Contrastingly, Senegal’s decision to host an ad hoc 
tribunal keeps Habré’s prosecution within Africa rather than moving it to a 
distant forum like The Hague.110 This is a noteworthy distinction since moving 
the forum abroad would likely disrupt any real connection to survivors and the 
families of those who have passed.111 The difference between the two forums 
highlights an important finding: true justice in the prosecution of international 
crimes is best served in closest proximity to those who have fallen victim to the 
crimes.112 
Although there are important differences between the SCSL in The Hague 
and the ad hoc tribunal established to prosecute Habré, there are also significant 
similarities. One important similarity is the necessity of raising funds on an 
international scale.113 As noted earlier, the joint effort by a number of 
international donors has resulted in total contributions of nearly $12 million for 
the establishment of the ad hoc tribunal in Senegal.114 Funding the SCSL has not 
been a de minimus experience either.115 The operation of the SCSL has required 
voluntary contributions of some forty different nation-states throughout the 
world.116 The most significant of these donations have come from Canada, the 
Netherlands, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and the United States.117 The United 
Nations also contributed funding through subventions in 2004, 2011, and 2012.118 
The reality that both the SCSL and the ad hoc tribunal in Senegal have been 
incredibly expensive should not be ignored. The expense that these particular 
tribunals mandate delays the effective administration of justice and fails to utilize 
available resources.119 Proponents of these tribunals argue the tribunals can ensure 
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procedural issues.121 But, prosecution under the framework of the national court 
system is much more cost effective in light of the considerable expense needed to 
run the ad hoc tribunal.122 
V. COMPETING LEGAL THEORIES 
A. Natural Law Theory 
In addition to looking at international statutory law and other similar 
international law cases, natural law theory serves as another basis for concluding 
that retroactivity does not require Habré to be prosecuted through the means of 
an ad hoc international tribunal. In order to understand the basic principles of 
natural law theory, the inquiry must start with the teachings of Thomas Aquinas, 
who is credited with founding the framework of the theory.123 In his celebrated 
work Summa Theologiae, Aquinas defined “law” as, “nothing else than an 
ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the 
community, and promulgated.”124 It is from this basic definition that the theory of 
natural law arises.125 
According to natural law theorists, the basis of natural law theory lies within 
the first clause of Aquinas’s definition.126 The focus of the definition is the 
understanding that law is nothing more than an extension of reason.127 For 
Aquinas, the law must be a rational standard of conduct.128 Without the basis of 
reason there can be no law, and law not founded upon the principles of reason is 
no law at all.129 
In addition to the premise that law is founded upon reason, natural law theory 
rests upon another assumption: there are fundamental principles of law that can 
be found through nature.130 These same fundamental principles serve as the basis 
by which man may judge not only what is right but what ought to govern his own 
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actions.131 How are we to discover these fundamental principles? The answer is 
straightforward. The principles of the natural or inherent law that exist through 
nature are discoverable by the employ of the right use of reason.132 These inherent 
principles exist and apply to mankind at all times and without concern for the 
circumstance.133 Finally, natural law theory stands for the proposition that once 
we have discovered the principles of law in nature, law codified by the state or 
government is authoritative only in so far as it is derivative from these principles 
of law in nature.134 Thus, natural law theory focuses its inquiry on what the 
application of reason reveals about the place of humanity within its natural 
origin, rather than on what states have codified into law.135 
The natural law theory has been met with some criticism.136 One of the 
primary criticisms of natural law theory is that many things, which are in one 
sense unnatural, are not considered by many people to be unethical.137 Examples 
include an assortment of medical technologies, including vaccinations and 
chemotherapy.138 By the same logic, critics also identify some things, which are 
in a sense natural, but are believed by many to be unethical.139 Some examples in 
this regard include the feelings of revenge or prejudice.140 Another prevalent 
criticism often advanced by those who oppose the natural law theory is that men 
do not know, nor can they agree upon the content of natural law.141 Despite the 
fact that natural law theory has been around for hundreds of years, humanity 
cannot agree upon a detailed codification of the laws of nature.142 While this 
argument is valid to a certain extent, it is difficult for the critic of natural law 
theory to maintain that there is not any agreed upon understanding of the laws of 
nature.143 natural law proponents respond that certain actions, including torture 
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B. Legal Positivism 
Legal positivism is often cited as a foil to natural law theory.145 The 
jurisprudence of legal positivism proposes that the only legitimate sources of the 
law are those expressly enacted, adopted, or recognized by a governmental entity 
through its executive, legislative or judicial bodies.146 By requiring the law to be 
written,147 legal positivist theory ensures members of society will be explicitly 
placed on notice as to their rights, and the legal obligations the state demands 
from them.148 Furthermore, legal positivism asserts that societies have developed 
legal systems that depend largely on certain structures of governance, and not on 
the extent to which it satisfies notions of democracy, the rule of law, and various 
ideals of justice.149 
One of the hallmarks of legal positivism is what is known as the separability 
thesis.150 Generally speaking, “the separability thesis asserts that law and morality 
are conceptually distinct.”151 While some scholars read this to mean that the 
definition of law must be entirely free from notions of morality,152 other scholars 
have taken a less exclusive approach to the issue.153 Herbert Lionel Adolphus 
Hart, taking on the latter view, once described the separability thesis by stating, 
“the simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce 
or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so.”154 
Although the separability thesis maintains that there are moral constraints on 
legal validity, “it still implies the existence of a possible legal system in which 
there are no moral constraints on legal validity.”155 
The application of legal positivism has also been met with robust criticism.156 
One of the most cited criticisms of the legal positivist theory is that it fails to give 
morality its due consideration.157 Critics assert: 
A theory that insists on the facticity of law seems to contribute little to 
our understanding that law has important functions in making human life 
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go well, that the rule of law is a prized ideal, and that the language and 
practice of law is highly moralized. Accordingly, positivism’s critics 
maintain that the most important features of law are not to be found in its 
source-based character, but in law’s capacity to advance the common 
good, to secure human rights, or to govern with integrity.158 
In other words, the critics of legal positivism cite the separability thesis and 
its fundamental implications as the source of the issue.159 The critics maintain that 
any legal construction necessarily depends, to some extent, on a notion of 
morality.160 
The conflicts between natural law theory and legal positivism are clear. 
Under the former, whether or not an act is a wrong, and thus punishable by the 
law, depends upon the employment of reason to deduce binding rules of moral 
behavior.161 Under the latter, whether or not an act is a punishable wrong depends 
not on what the human condition says about the morality of the act, but rather 
what a particular legal enactment says is a punishable wrong.162 Unlike the legal 
positivist theory, natural law is less concerned with what the law itself says or 
whether it exists in codified form, and is instead focused on what our common 
human nature recognizes as a just or unjust act.163 Natural law theory is an active 
inquiry, asking whether or not the action is right or wrong.164 In contrast, 
positivist theory employs a passive inquiry by focusing on the extent to which the 
law is systemically valid. In other words, whether or not it is part of the legal 
system.165 
The application of either one of these theories can produce strikingly 
different results as to whether or not individuals should be prosecuted based on a 
retroactive theory of guilt.166 For example, it is evident that natural law provided 
some foundation for the prosecution of Nazi leaders and offenders of the 
Holocaust, but in the same context legal positivists face a unique difficulty in that 
these same offenders were merely following the law as a product of the relevant 
political system.167 While legal positivism certainly has its merits in certain 
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circumstances, it is the position of this Comment that a strict adherence to legal 
positivism at all times can be a dangerous practice often resulting in grave 
injustices to the human race.168 Legal positivism emasculates the social function 
of the law by preventing it from serving human needs.169 A law removed from 
human need and human nature has no place in our society. This Comment 
assumes the application of a natural law perspective because, “the most important 
features of law are not to be found in its source-based character, but in law’s 
capacity to advance the common good, to secure human rights, or to govern with 
integrity.”170 
VI. SOLUTIONS 
A. From the Perspective of International Law 
Despite the ruling of the ECOWAS Court, the option to prosecute Habré 
within the Senegalese court system should have been preserved, and the creation 
of the ad hoc international tribunal is all but necessary. As stated previously, 
Article 15, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR is plainly worded;171 the provision explicitly 
requires only that the crime committed be a criminal offense under national or 
international law at the time it was committed.172 Surely the drafters of the 
provision must have included the reference to “international law” for a reason. It 
seems evident that the only reason to include this language would be to ensure 
that an individual could not escape punishment for an international crime simply 
by noting that the crime charged was not punishable under the national law at the 
time the act was committed.173 
Some may argue that the basic rationale for having a prohibition of 
retroactive criminal laws is to give the perpetrator proper notice that their 
action(s) constitutes a crime.174 This is undoubtedly a noble and just rationale; 
indeed, the notion that one may be charged for a criminal act in which there is no 
possible way to know the act is criminal offends our sense of justice.175 That 
being said, we must remember that Habré was acting as a head of state during the 
commission of his offenses.176 Acting in the head of state capacity necessarily 
implies correspondence with foreign nations, and at least a basic awareness of 
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international law and custom. To say that Habré was not put on notice of the fact 
his actions were criminal is an assertion which cannot be supported. The actions 
of Habré were quintessentially criminal.177 In the history of the human race, little 
else has been more sinister than the ethnic cleansing and torture of other human 
beings.178 When crimes of this nature are committed, notice that the action is 
wrong necessarily accompanies the act.179 As Jan Hessbruegge explains, “[t]he 
rationale behind the prohibition of retroactive criminal laws is to put the 
perpetrator on notice that his or her action constitutes a crime, but this is already 
served if the perpetrator could have known that he or she was committing what is 
recognized as a crime on the international plane.”180 Hessbruegge applies a “could 
have known” standard to the notice issue, which is a relatively low burden to 
satisfy.181 This standard is easily met when applied to a former head of state. 
An additional argument, often made in favor of the prohibition of retroactive 
criminal laws, is that Article 15, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR is a subsidiary means 
of interpretation.182 It has been said, “[t]his provision appears as a sort of fallback 
option. . . to be relied upon when neither national law nor treaty or customary 
international law rules criminalize certain conduct.”183 To begin, let it suffice to 
say that this is not the issue with respect to Habré’s case. As has been identified 
above, the ICCPR does criminalize much of Habré’s conduct.184 But, the question 
still remains as to whether Article 15, paragraph 2 should be limited to instances 
where international law does not criminalize the conduct.185 The circumstance 
suggested by this interpretation of Article 15, paragraph 2 is a situation where 
there is no international law on the issue, but where the act is criminal according 
to general principles of law.186 It is argued that “the principle of legality is hardly 
reconcilable with the criminalization of certain conduct only on the basis of 
general principles of law.”187 While this argument makes sense within the context 
of lesser offenses, the same should be said of a crime that is of such a grave 
nature as torture and a campaign of ethnic cleansing. Article 15, paragraph 2 was 
included for a reason, to provide a safeguard to punish acts which are so heinous 
that it would offend our sense of humanity to let them go unpunished.188 
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B. From the Perspective of Natural Law Theory 
The application of natural law theory stands for the proposition that, 
irrespective of the ECOWAS Court ruling, Habré could have been prosecuted 
within the current Senegalese legal system. As a result, the employ of an 
international ad hoc tribunal hosted in Senegal, although consistent with the 
ECOWAS Court ruling, is all but necessary. To summarize, one of the essential 
claims of natural law theory is that it “is based on the belief that certain 
principles of law are inherent in the very nature of things and that men can 
discern these by means of reason.”189 
Let us again recall the extent and capacity of the crimes against humanity 
that Habré is alleged to have committed. As outlined by The Commission of 
Inquiry, it was determined that no less than 3,780 people were killed as a direct 
result of the ethnic cleansing campaign brought on by Habré’s reign of terror.190 It 
is difficult to even conceive of an act more heinous than one defined by a mission 
to exterminate those of a particular race or tribe.191 Murder based on a hatred of a 
specific group clearly finds itself in violation of the natural law theory.192 As 
explained by Aquinas, 
Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of 
whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid all 
vices, from which the virtuous abstain; but only the more grievous vices, 
from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those 
that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human 
society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft 
and such like.193 
As outlined above, Aquinas argues that certain injurious acts such as murder 
are violative of an inherent understanding of right and wrong within all of us.194 
Aquinas maintains that it is basic reason common to all mankind that such 
actions are unjust and are qualified as an inherent wrong.195 Accordingly, by this 
line of reasoning, acts of genocide are inconsistent with the basic tenants of 
natural law theory.196 
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Having concluded that acts of ethnic cleansing are determined by reason to 
be in violation of natural law, the next question is whether a theory of natural law 
justifies prosecuting Habré under the current Senegalese legal system for a crime 
that was not codified when committed. The answer to this question is that such 
an action is entirely within the scope of the natural law theory.197 As is concluded 
above, the principles of law, as they exist in nature, apply to everyone at all times 
and in all circumstances.198 This is necessarily the case as the entire essence of 
natural law theory is dependent upon the reasonable conclusion of what is right, 
as held in common by humanity.199 Furthermore, natural law theory stands for the 
proposition that man-made laws are only just so long as they stem from the 
principles of law in nature.200 The assumption of this claim is that principles of 
law exist prior to their codification. 
In the particular case at issue, ethnic cleansing unquestionably violates 
principles of law as they exist in nature. Hence, the fact that an act was 
committed before a specific codification was established, in a specific location, at 
a specific time does not change the quality or the character of the act. The act of 
ethnic cleansing is an inherent wrong that does and has existed in perpetuity.201 
Therefore, natural law theory supports the proposition that Habré could well be 
prosecuted for his crimes against humanity under the framework of the 
Senegalese legal system even despite the procedural ex post facto issue 
presented.202 
VII. CONCLUSION 
What is the fundamental aim of any legal system if not justice? To where do 
the victims of terror and ethnic cleansing turn when procedure stands in the way 
of their vindication? Are there no worse crimes than these? Such are the 
questions that this Comment has had the occasion to address. The inquiry as to 
whether Habré may be prosecuted for his actions despite the fact that no such 
crimes for those same actions were codified under national law at the time they 
were committed203 is not an easy question to confront. It is true the ECOWAS 
Court was left with only two options, both of which ran the risk of setting the 
worse of two precedents.204 One the one hand, a ruling allowing Senegal to 
prosecute within the bounds of its national court system might have affirmed a 
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kind of universal jurisdiction in Africa, potentially allowing for the future 
prosecution of similar crimes.205 Indeed such a ruling might have been possible 
had the ECOWAS Court given more clout to the second paragraph of Article 15 
of the ICCPR,206 which pays tribute to the Natural Law legal philosophy.207 
Alternatively, the ECOWAS Court chose instead to set a precedent that on 
occasion would require African nations to establish a completely separate 
system, which would depend entirely on international funding, even if only a 
single individual were to stand trial.208 Which precedent is the better of the two? 
This Comment stands for the proposition that independent sovereign nations 
should be able to prosecute the most egregious of human rights violations despite 
the principle of non-retroactivity. This proposition is supported directly by 
international statutory law.209 Additionally, this same proposition champions the 
principles of natural law legal theory.210 Natural law theory was not chosen 
because it was convenient to do so. Rather this legal theory was chosen because 
it is the most consistent with the universal truth that the freedom of life is the 
quintessence of our existence.211 A rule of law inconsistent with such a notion, as 
was issued by the ECOWAS Court, delays justice, wastes resources, and misses 
the most perfect opportunity to send a message to political leaders who continue 
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